Chapter 6: The State’s response to allegations of abuse at Hokio School and the Kohitere Centre
209. The State failed in its responsibility to properly oversee and monitor these institutions and ensure children and young people received proper care. One example of this is how they responded to reports of abuse. Principals were required to report to the Director-General of Social Welfare any incidents of physical assault by staff.[483] However, these reports laid the blame on the child or young person for ‘provoking’ the staff member and therefore did not hold the staff member to account.[484] They all recommended that no further action be taken, and it appears the Social Welfare Department did not take any further action. They accepted the reports from management, taking the managers at their word.
210. There were also very few NZ Police investigations into abuse at Hokio School and Kohitere Centre, another failure of State oversight. NZ European survivor Lindsay Eddy told the Inquiry the Levin Police saw the boys as a nuisance more than anything else, and this stopped him from reporting abuse to them.[485] Other survivors have told the Inquiry that when they did make complaints to NZ Police, they often retracted their statements because of the police process. When complaints were referred to NZ Police by the staff, such as the grooming and sexual behaviour of Mike Walker, the investigations were inadequate. Serious questions are also raised by the NZ Police decision not to investigate the hundreds of allegations of sexual abuse by Maahi Tukapua that were brought to them by a chaplain.
211. All this points to systemic failings by NZ Police and the State in relation to complaints of abuse of children and young people in social welfare institutions.
The State acknowledges abuse and neglect occurred at Kohitere Centre and has offered some concessions
212. At the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing in August 2022, both Oranga Tamariki Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani and Chief Social Worker Peter Whitcombe acknowledged the no-narking culture at Kohitere Centre, and that the language used there, was reminiscent of a prison environment.[486] Mr Te Kani also agreed the culture of extreme violence and no narking contributed to the abuse and silencing of children and young people in Hokio School and Kohitere Centre.[487] Mr Te Kani acknowledged that aggression, assault and violence was used to control boys.[488]
213. When asked if he agreed that sexual abuse was systemic, Mr Te Kani instead said that there was “a large number of instances of sexual abuse” during the scope period. [489] When asked for clarification, Mr Te Kani agreed it was a systemic problem.[490]
214. Known sexual abusers were moved to Hokio School instead of being reported to NZ Police.[491] Management sought name suppression to prevent sexual abuse from being made public, saw boys as complicit in their own sexual abuse, and failed to further investigate allegations of sexual abuse. Based on that evidence, along with the evidence of multiple staff members sexually abusing children, the conclusion of the Inquiry is that the sexual abuse was systemic.
The State response to historic claims was limited
The Ministry of Social Development report into Kohitere Centre was not balanced
215. In 2008, the Ministry of Social Development’s Historic Claims unit commissioned qualitative research into Kohitere Centre, which involved face-to-face interviews with former staff members and children and young people who were sent to the residences from 1950 to 1985. The Understanding Kohitere report prioritised the staff point of view and minimised that of former residents. Of the 94 interviews, 68 were with former residential, departmental or external staff and just 26 were with former residents. Of these 26 residents, 18 were Pākehā, eight were Māori and one was a Pacific person.[492] This is not representative of the children and young people at Kohitere Centre, most of whom were tamariki and rangatahi Māori. The report was peer reviewed by three people, two of whom were part of the Historic Claims team and were also former staff members of Kohitere Centre.[493] The fact that two of the peer reviewers were former staff members of Kohitere Centre can be seen as a significant conflict of interest.
216. Two things are apparent from the Understanding Kohitere report and its findings. First, the report paints a very different picture of the institution compared to the survivor testimony the Inquiry has heard. Second, the report consistently uses language to frame survivors as ‘delinquent’, dangerous and the main perpetrators of violence, while reiterating that staff abuse was isolated and infrequent. While the report does acknowledge that abuse by staff took place, the Inquiry finds that the conclusions drawn by the report appear to downplay the extent and severity of the abuse.
217. The report described the children and young people as ‘anti-social’,[494] ‘unpredictable’,[495] “extremely disobedient”,[496] ‘volatile’,[497] ‘unruly’[498] and ‘problematic’.[499] On more than 18 occasions, children and young people are described as dangerous to staff and other boys, or as having access to dangerous weapons. Staff are never referred to as dangerous, instead they are described as fearful,[500] in danger,[501] threatened[502] or vulnerable.[503] In one instance the report states:
“Residents could, and did, make it particularly difficult for staff they did not like, and their abusiveness and refusal to comply drove some staff members to leave Kohitere Boys’ Training Centre.”[504]
218. The Understanding Kohitere report acknowledged that different staff hit and punched children and young people in the face.[505] However, several times the report claims these were occasional occurrences[506] or described it as “physical punishment”.[507] Calling it punishment appears to justify the act as discipline, rather than as abuse. In the report, staff also described children and young people being given “a cuff around the ear”[508], or “a light boot in the bum”[509], to get them to do what they wanted. While the report acknowledges these as acts of physical mistreatment it also described the physical punishment of children and young people in the forestry unit as “well-intentioned”, though ‘inappropriate’.[510] This downplays the fact that these were still acts of physical abuse.
219. The report minimised the severity and extent of staff abuse and concluded that it was not systemic.[511] It instead described an environment of peer bullying and violence,[512] and so shifted the blame to the children and young people. Given that this report helped Ministry of Social Development staff judge survivor claims, it provided the ministry some justification for not holding itself or former staff to account.
220. Despite describing instances of physical discipline, and serious and covert acts of physical abuse, the Understanding Kohitere report ultimately concludes that: “Although not quantified by this research, it appears that most residents went through Kohitere Centre without being physically punished by staff.”[513] This is contrary to the accounts and sworn testimony given to the Inquiry by survivors. They independently gave consistent, compelling evidence of serious and regular physical abuse by staff members across the decades. These accounts and the way in which the report was compiled persuades the Inquiry that the report likely minimised the extent and degree of physical abuse by staff.
Survivors were not believed and the redress process was inadequate and limited
221. According to the Inquiry’s analysis of Ministry of Social Development data, there have been 348 individual claims made to the agency for abuse at Hokio School or Kohitere Centre. Survivors have been paid settlements or ex-gratia payments ranging from $2,000 up to $90,000.[514] Some survivors have also received payments from ACC.[515]
222. Of the survivors the Inquiry spoke to from Hokio School and Kohitere Centre, 33 told the Inquiry they had received some form of compensation from the Ministry of Social Development or ACC.[516] A further 18 were still awaiting on the outcome of their claims. Some survivors told the Inquiry they were not interested in pursuing redress, while others were considering it. Survivors told the Inquiry the redress process was drawn out, taking years for an outcome to be reached, and they felt worn down by it. One survivor said it was 17 years from when he first lodged his claim until it was finally resolved.[517] Survivors also told the Inquiry that when they received their case files, these were often heavily redacted.[518]
223. Once an offer was made, survivors often felt rushed or coerced into accepting it and like they had no other choice.[519] They described the payments as “blood money” or “hush money”.[520] NZ European survivor Mark Goold said:
“The whole historic claims process was an insult. I felt cheated and as though I was violated all over again. $12,000 for a lifetime of abuse is a disgrace, an insult – it’s not even a year’s wages on the dole.”[521]
224. Some survivors told the Inquiry it was not about the money but rather having someone acknowledge and be accountable for the abuse. Many said the apology from the State was not genuine and did not show accountability.[522] NZ European survivor Desmond Hurring told the Inquiry:
“I feel like the money I got from MSD is ‘dirty money’, mainly because MSD has never shown any real remorse or given me a proper apology or acknowledgement for the abuse and harm I suffered.”[523]
225. Some survivors decided to take their case to trial. The Inquiry investigated the White brothers’ case in the Inquiry’s interim report He Purapura Ora, he Māra Tipu – From Redress to Puretumu Torowhānui. Their case was tried at the High Court, which ruled in favour of the Crown, and then again at the Court of Appeal, with the same outcome. Despite the High Court judge accepting it was likely Earl White (one of the brothers) had been sexually abused by Hokio School cook Michael Ansell, having considered the expert evidence of consultant psychiatrists called by the brothers and the Crown, the judge found that this had “not made a material contribution to his [psychological and psychiatric] difficulties”.[524] In the Inquiry’s report He Purapura Ora, he Māra Tipu – From Redress to Puretumu Torowhānui, the Inquiry found that the Crown did not behave as a model litigant in the White case and approached and conducted it in ‘win at all costs’ manner.[525]
226. Māori survivor Daniel Rei (Ngāti Toa Rangatira) made a claim that was being tracked towards trial in the High Court. It made allegations of the abuse he had suffered in the Kohitere Centre forestry unit, as well as the long periods he had been kept in secure. In the end he settled out of court,[526] and he told the Inquiry this was because of the difficulties he experienced going through the preliminary processes before trial: “I was very anxious about being grilled in cross-examination and more generally about talking about the subject matter.”[527]
Footnotes
[483] Letter from superintendent to the manager of Kohitere: Definition of corporal punishment (28 September 1961).
[484] Note from manager to the superintendent, Levin Boys’ Training Centre regarding use of physical force by staff member (20 March 1964, page 1); Note to superintendent, Levin Boys’ Training Centre regarding physical punishment by staff member (7 February 1964, page 1); Note from manager to superintendent, Levin Boys’ Training Centre regarding corporal punishment (3 October 1963, page 1); Note from manager to superintendent, Levin Boys’ Training Centre regarding corporal punishment (30 October 1962); Note from manager to superintendent: corporal punishment (27 August 1962).
[485] Witness statement of Lindsay Eddy (24 March 2021, para 110).
[486] Transcript of evidence of Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani and Chief Social Worker Peter Whitcombe for Oranga Tamariki at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 24 August 2022, pages 807–809).
[487] Transcript of evidence of Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani and Chief Social Worker Peter Whitcombe for Oranga Tamariki at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 24 August 2022, pages 807–809).
[488] Transcript of evidence of Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani for Oranga Tamariki at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 23 August 2022, page 710).
[489] Transcript of evidence of Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani for Oranga Tamariki at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 23 August 2022, page 747).
[490] Transcript of evidence of Chief Executive Chappie Te Kani and Chief Social Worker Peter Whitcombe for Oranga Tamariki at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 24 August 2022, page 807).
[491] Letter from acting assistant director to Director-General of Social Welfare regarding Mr B Zygaldo (28 May 1972, page 2).
[492] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, pages 24–25).
[493] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 27).
[494] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 117).
[495] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 166).
[496] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 177).
[497] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 145).
[498] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 166).
[499] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 18).
[500] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 187).
[501] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 166).
[502] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 145).
[503] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 135).
[504] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 202).
[505] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, pages 120, 123, 132–133, 164).
[506] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, pages 120, 132, 164).
[507] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 164).
[508] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, pages 132, 163).
[509] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 133).
[510] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 15).
[511] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 120).
[512] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, pages 9–10).
[513] Ministry of Social Development, Understanding Kohitere (2009, page 17).
[514] Ministry of Social Development, Response to Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care Notice to Produce 14, Schedule A, para 4a, Allegations of abuse in residences.
[515] Witness statements of Mr LT (7 March 2022, para 50); Vincent Hogg (15 December 2021, para 182) and Tani Tekoronga (19 January 2022, para 159); Private session transcript of survivor who wishes to remain anonymous (21 January 2021, page 14).
[516] Based on 135 witness statements and transcribed private sessions that were analysed. In total 165 survivors from these settings spoke to the Inquiry. As untranscribed private sessions were not included in the analysis the numbers may be higher.
[517] Witness statement of Toni Jarvis (12 December 2021, para 213).
[518] Witness statements of Poihipi McIntyre (14 March 2023, paras 5.2–5.3) and Mr TD (25 February 2023, para 8).
[519] Witness statements of Wiremu Waikari (27July 2021, para 351) and Michael Taylor (24 April 2023, para 5.1).
[520] Witness statements of Danny Akula (13 October 2021, paras 247, 250) and Kevin England (28 January 2021, para 235).
[521] Witness statement of Mark Goold (8 June 2021, para 110).
[522] Witness statement of Mr RY (6 April 2023, paras 5.3–5.4).
[523] Witness statement of Desmond Hurring (17 February 2021, para 90).
[524] Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, He Purapura Ora, he Māra Tipu: From Redress to Puretumu Torowhānui, Volume 2 (December 2021, page 21).
[525] Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, He Purapura Ora, he Māra Tipu: From Redress to Puretumu Torowhānui, Volume 2 (December 2021, page 27).
[526] Crown Law, Deed of settlement and release (22 March 2010).
[527] Witness statement of Daniel Rei (10 February 2021, para 260).