Chapter 5: Factors that caused or contributed to abuse and neglect at Whakapakari
153. The various reports and investigations throughout Te Whakapakari Youth Programme’s history reveal consistent factors that enabled abuse to occur.
People at the centre of abuse and neglect in care
154. Although each person in care had unique care needs, every person needed safeguarding and strong protective factors.
Factors for entry into care became factors for abuse and neglect for care
155. Many of the circumstances that made it more likely a child or young person would enter Whakapakari often became the factor for why they were more susceptible to abuse and neglect in care.
156. These factors included:
a. being raised in poverty and experiencing deprivation
b. being Māori and racially targeted
c. being Pacific and racially targeted
d. experience of mental distress with unmet needs
e. experiencing sign or multiple adverse childhood events
i. experiencing or witnessing violence, abuse and neglect at home or other care settings
ii. having a family member pass away or attempt to
iii. aspects of their environment undermine their sense of safety, stability and bonding such as:
growing up with parents experiencing substance use problems
mental distress
instability due to parental separation or incarceration
f. having a deferential attitude to people in positions of authority, including faith leaders and medical professionals
g. other reasons such as age or gender
h. experiencing or being any combination of the above.
Abusers were embedded within the make-up of Whakapakari
157. Abuse was an ingrained part of the culture at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme. It was routinely carried out, sanctioned, and encouraged by John da Silva, supervisors and other staff and in some instances by other young people.
158. The nature of abuse inflicted by John da Silva, supervisors and other staff included serious physical, sexual and psychological abuse against children and young people.
159. The abuse that was inflicted by other children and young people was sometimes instigated by staff, such as the Flying Squad, who assisted supervisors to enforce the rules using physical violence. However, children and young people who were not part of the Flying Squad also physically and sexually abused other children and young people.
160. Staff and volunteers are a critical part of safeguarding children and young people. They can be the first to see signs of abuse and neglect. They are often the only adults present to step in or respond to abuse or neglect. Some staff at Whakapakari were aware and the Inquiry found no evidence that they had escalated issues.
161. Complaints of physical and sexual abuse were made to John and Wilhelmina da Silva, but they took no action.[252] Despite this, Wilhelmina da Silva was quoted in the 2008 article as stating: “All this so-called abuse happened years ago … There’s been plenty of opportunities for them to say ‘Hey, listen.’ And I would have to say it’s all about the money, isn’t it?”[253]
162. Many survivors also disclosed abuse to their social workers. [254] In some instances allegations were investigated, however, in most cases no police referrals or any other action was taken until 2004.[255]
163. Health practitioners also saw young people from Te Whakapakari Youth Programme. In 2003, a community nurse saw a young person four days after an altercation. The nurse recorded that the young person complained of an injury, and that the person should see a doctor if it did not improve. When the young person left the island six days after the incident, an x-ray indicated that the young person had a fractured shoulder. Neither the nurse or staff from Whakapakari notified the young person’s social worker of the injury.[256]
164. A local police officer told a social worker in 1994 of his concerns of ritualised abuse of children and young people at Whakapakari, but there are no records available to establish if any action had been taken about these concerns.[257] The Children and Young Persons Service did not act on these concerns either.[258]
165. Many survivors told the Inquiry they disclosed abuse and neglect to staff or bystanders. Some staff would make excuses for the abuser or dismiss the disclosure as lies.
Institutional factors that contributed to abuse and neglect in care
166. A range of institutional factors contributed to the abuse. Recruiting and retaining suitable staff members was an “ongoing frustration” for Te Whakapakari Youth Programme.[259] Obstacles such as the camp’s remote location, harsh conditions, low pay and participants who were experiencing their own challenges made it difficult to attract staff with suitable experience.
Inadequate vetting processes for staff
167. Supervisors were not subjected to police vetting.[260] The 1992 documentary Breaking the Barrier noted that “the supervisors are no angels either, including former alcoholics and criminals.”[261] The 1997 Green Report also acknowledged the lack of police vetting and that several supervisors had criminal convictions.[262]
168. The same issue was noted in a 2004 report recording that police checks were not evident for staff who did not declare convictions.[263] It further noted that although supervisors were undergoing training for outdoor skills, there also needed to be training in social work intervention, human growth and development, non-violent crisis intervention or recognising the dynamics of abuse.[264]
169. Of further concern, staff files for supervisors did not include a curriculum vitae for five of the seven staff. There was also no evidence of what the interview process consisted of. In 2004 the Child, Youth and Family Service concluded the standards for staffing had not been met.[265]
170. Several survivors told the Inquiry that supervisors had gang connections. One of these supervisors severely beat survivor Jason Fenton.[266] Internal email correspondence from the Child, Youth and Family Service in 2003 commented on this incident: “If [name] – the alleged abuser – is their best supervisor, what is their worst like and how is this issue impacting on client management generally?”[267]
171. None of the adults working at Whakapakari were vetted to ensure they were an appropriate and safe person to work with young people. The abuse perpetrated by staff and John da Silva, as well as their backgrounds, illustrate that they should never have been entrusted with the care of young people. Similarly, the staff were not trained, skilled professionals who could conduct successful interventions in young people’s lives. In many instances they did not produce a curriculum vitae to demonstrate any suitability for employment.
Inadequately trained staff
172. The lack of training and difficult working conditions were repeatedly raised in reports from the outset of the programme. In a 1989 report following a two-week programme, John da Silva wrote that supervisors urgently required training to deal with young people who he described as “extremely difficult and disturbed”.[268] In 1995, the Thom Report noted that collectively, the young people attending Te Whakapakari Youth Programme took a “high skill level to be managed effectively”, and that young people should have the same rights to an effective and professional intervention as they would if placed at another Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service residential centre. The report said the lack of a structured or reviewed programme and an inadequate level of staff expertise meant there was a level of risk for young people attending Whakapakari.[269] This issue did not resolve throughout the life of the programme. Staff were not professional social workers trained to assist young people.
Visitation standards breached
173. Social worker visits of state wards were meant to be a critical intervention point to prevent abuse and neglect in care. Minimum visitation sets were set in 1957. Evidence shows that the visitation of at least once every four months was never met.
174. Whakapakari had no electricity or road access, and its isolation on a sparsely populated island made children more vulnerable to abuse. The Green Report noted that the Children, Young Persons and Their Family Service had a requirement to visit young people in the Director-General’s custody every six weeks but failed to do so due to the isolation of the programme. It noted “the occasional fleeting visit from a social worker when placing a young person does not fulfil that requirement”.[270] The Green Report recommended that a monthly or six weekly visit from a departmental social worker would meet this responsibility.[271] However on 7 September 1998, a further report noted “It is both disappointing and disturbing that a CYPFS liaison worker has still not been appointed after 21 years of the programme’s existence”.[272] Survivors told the Inquiry if a social worker had visited, they would have disclosed the abuse.[273]
Whānau connection was absent
175. Whānau were unable to contact or visit survivors.[274] Survivors were only able to contact their whānau by post, but staff often checked mail, and letters containing complaints of abuse were destroyed. There was limited communication, even in emergencies.[275] It was very difficult for children and young people to tell their whānau what was happening or to ask for help. In some cases, parents were actively discouraged from any contact with their children.
176. After a boy was seriously assaulted on 1 June 1997, his mother contacted the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service advising that she was unable to reach him by phone. Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service records reflect that Te Whakapakari Youth Programme did not allow him to speak with his father, who attempted to contact him.[276]
177. In October 1997, survivor David Bagley’s mother contacted Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service to advise that David’s brother was in intensive care and not expected to live. She was adamant her son should return home to see his brother before he died, but this was not facilitated by social workers.[277]
178. The Child, Youth and Family Service records demonstrate parents were discouraged from visiting; one was told it was “not the kaupapa of Whakapakari to allow family visits”.[278] These issues persisted throughout the life of the programme. As late as 2003, young people were unable to contact their families, despite being on the programme for months. Requests to social workers to facilitate contact with family were not acted on.[279]
179. Psychiatrist Dr Enys Delmage explained that children need to be managed as closely as possible to their family and home community. Considerable damage can be done by forcing a child to live away from their sense of self, their sense of identity and their sense of home.[280]
180. The State failed to address or mitigate this major safeguarding issue. The Child, Youth and Family Service and its successors should have ensured that young people had access to whānau and to social workers.
Conclusion on the institutional factors that contributed to abuse at Whakapakari
181. The isolation and the consequent lack of regular monitoring or oversight was a major factor in the perpetration of abuse. It meant that abuse could occur undetected. Young people had no way to complain or escape from the abuse while they were isolated from social workers, police and their families.
182. These institutional factors meant basic measures to safeguard young people were not taken.
Systemic and practical issues at Whakapakari
The standards that applied in social welfare care did not apply to Whakapakari
183. From 1 February 1997, the Children, Young Persons and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996 provide a set of care standards for those in residences operated by the State.[281] However, these regulations did not apply to residences operated by third parties. While third parties had to meet generic Standards for Approval set by the Community Funding Agency in order to attain status as a Child and Family Support Service, these were not set out in legislation and were not nearly as comprehensive. Therefore, important legal safeguards that were in place for children in State residences were not in place for young people at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme. This was a major policy failing. The regulations provided for rights of children and young people in social welfare residences, which include the right to:
a. A high standard of professional care consistent with a National Code of Practice, and the purposes and principles set out in the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989;[282]
b. Be informed of the provision of the Regulations, the care plan for each child, and the grievance procedure in the residence for dealing with complaints;[283]
c. Wear the child or young person’s own clothing;[284]
d. Personal privacy, including the right not to be required to be naked in the presence of any staff member or any other person;[285]
e. Visits and communications with any parent or guardian, social worker, teacher, or lawyer;[286]
f. Send and receive unopened mail;[287]
g. Access to adequate legal, recreational, spiritual and social services and facilities, having regard to the culture and background of the child or young person;[288]
h. Access for not less than five hours per day to educational activities, vocational training opportunities, or if neither are available, regular, structured, learning activities; and access to participate in regular social, recreational, sporting and cultural activities for not less than two hours each day;[289]
i. Prompt, adequate, and appropriate health services and health care;[290]
j. To lodge a complaint under a grievance procedure, which was required to be established by the manager of every State care residence, and to have decisions reviewed by a grievance panel, and to have reasonable access to a barrister, youth advocate or other person nominated to advocate for the child or young person in relation to their complaint.[291]
184. The regulations also provided limitations on powers of punishment and discipline. No member of staff of a residence was permitted to use physical force to punish any child or young person,[292] or to discipline or treat or speak to a child or young person which inflicts torture, cruelty or is inhuman, degrades or humiliates, or is likely to induce an unreasonable amount of fear or anxiety.[293]
185. The type of punishment and sanctions used in residences was restricted to those approved in writing in advance by the Director-General of Social Welfare,[294] and if imposed, had to be logged in a daily log maintained by the residence.[295]
186. There were strict limitations on the power to strip search, which was revoked altogether from 2002.[296] Internal examinations could only be conducted on a similarly strict basis, by medical practitioners, and this power was revoked from 2000.[297] There were also rules governing the use of, and facilities for, solitary confinement. [298],
187. Many reports highlighted that Te Whakapakari Youth Programme lacked an incident and accident reporting procedure and a written policy for investigations of abuse. No procedures were in place to ensure the safety of a young person was considered. At one stage participants needing to go to the toilet were at risk because they could be “jumped” by other young people .[299] Incident reports often failed to correctly describe events and sometimes written evidence did not concur with interviews held with staff.[300] There was also no written standard procedure to deal with any incident of abuse occurred involving a staff member.[301]
188. A 2004 Child, Youth and Family Service report noted that although numerous incidents were recorded, it was not possible to determine what resolutions had occurred and therefore didn’t meet the standards required. For example, there was no evidence of notification to the Child, Youth and Family Service following a young person requiring medical attention after being hit with a tokotoko stick by a supervisor. [302]
189. Important safeguarding features identified by psychiatrist Dr Enys Delmage are regular debriefing periods after incidents and an atmosphere of open communication within a provider of care and between agencies, as well as regular internally arranged reviews.[303] This did not occur at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme.
The process for making, handling and responding to complaints was inadequate
190. Young people faced significant barriers to making complaints, including the censorship of their mail, the inability to contact family and whānau, and threats by staff to survivors’ family members if they tried to complain.
191. Survivors told us authority figures, such as NZ Police or social workers, dismissed or ignored evidence or allegations of abuse. Māori and Cook Islands survivor Ngatokorima Mauauri (Tainui) escaped the island with another young person when they were working on one of the boats. When they arrived at Auckland they were arrested by police. Ngatokorima reported the abuse to NZ Police, who told him to speak with his social worker. When he approached his social worker, Ngatokorima said they didn’t appear to care or believe him.[304] Māori survivor Mr SL (Tainui) said police returning absconders to the island would have seen the bruises on their face and bodies from the abuse, but they did nothing about it.[305]
192. Australian, Aboriginal and Māori survivor Michael Bennett (Ngāti Porou) reported to the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service that he was raped at Whakapakari, but the Youth Aid officer did not believe him.[306] Michael said: “I was mentally, physically, emotionally and sexually abused on that island. Then when I complained I was told it never happened.”[307]
193. In July 1997, a boy wrote to his mother saying he had been beaten up twice and that he felt suicidal. The social worker recorded that John and Wilhelmina da Silva had reassured them the young person was fine and they had spoken to the young person on the phone.[308] However, there was no recorded visit nor was there discussion of removing the young person from Te Whakapakari Youth Programme.
194. Young people feared that they may be threatened and beaten if they attempted to complain.[309] Māori survivor Mr FQ (Ngāti Pikiao, Ngāpuhi, Te Rarawa) was sexually abused and raped by a supervisor at Whakapakari in 1999. The supervisor told Mr FQ that if he reported it, the abuse would get worse.[310] In 2003, a supervisor raped survivor Mr PJ on numerous occasions. He complained to Wilhelmina and John da Silva, who took no action. Mr PJ wrote a letter of complaint but it was intercepted by a staff member, who then beat him for trying to disclose the abuse. He was also threatened with ‘hidings’ or a punishment of carrying bags of wet sand if he ‘narked’ about the abuse. Mr PJ was not allowed to contact his parents or social worker. He said: “What happened to me at Whakapakari still rates as one of the worst things that has ever happened to me. It definitely stuffed me up mentally.”[311]
195. NZ European survivor Scott Carr described what happened when a supervisor, Mita Mohi, discovered a letter to his mother complaining of a serious assault by a staff member:
“Mr Mohi told me to apologise to [staff member] repeatedly, until I cried. To stop me crying, [staff member] choked me until I could not breathe. Mr Mohi then told me to rip up the letter and put it into the fire. Before I did this, Mr Mohi wrote my mother’s address and told me he would go there, and ‘make her pay’ if I ever wrote negative things about Whakapakari again. Mr Mohi also told me he would ‘get’ me or my family if I ever told anyone about the choking.”[312]
196. Young people told the Inquiry that although there were sessions to air grievances, they were unable to complain because the supervisors ran the sessions.[313] Survivor Mr PJ said: “At first, I complained about what was happening to me. I soon learned there was no point complaining because I would always get a hiding later on.”[314]
197. The official reaction to a complaint of abuse reinforced the ‘no narking’ culture that persisted in the social welfare care settings system and the consequences that young people would suffer for making complaints.
The State failed to respond to multiple allegations of abuse and neglect
198. The inadequacies of the investigations of, and responses to, serious allegations of abuse represent a gross failure by the State to monitor the programme over a 15-year period. As early as 1989, a staff member from Ōwairaka Boys’ Home made an internal recommendation that the State should stop all referrals to Te Whakapakari Youth Programme,[315] yet it was not until 2004 that the programme was suspended. A 2005 internal memorandum conceded that there had been substantiated allegations of violence against young people by staff, and poor monitoring of the programme.[316] The different allegations and reports are discussed below. Many of the forms of abuse and neglect at Whakapakari that were the subject of complaints at the time were against the law and should have been investigated by NZ Police and the Department of Social Welfare and its successors.
1989 Allegations of assault
199. On 23 June 1989, a camp supervisor and six other young people assaulted a boy on the programme for allegedly stealing tobacco. This incident, along with using the ‘Flying Squad’ to punish other young peoples, shows how the involvement of children and young people in abusive punishments was normalised on the island from the beginning.[317] John da Silva reported the assault to social worker Trevor Weaver, who subsequently raised concerns about the operation of Te Whakapakari Youth Programme, including inadequate funding, untrained staff and the use of Alcatraz for punishment.[318] Mr Weaver recommended the allegations be investigated. A written report of the incident in in the same month by John da Silva said the ‘offenders’ were “sent to an offshore island for a week.”[319] It does not appear that this incident was reported to the NZ Police, or any further action taken, other than removing the supervisor from the programme.[320]
200. On 19 July 1989, a staff member at Ōwairaka Boys Home, R Starck, wrote on behalf of the director to Assistant Director General of Social Welfare for the South and West Auckland Region Dick Rillstone. Starck said that given the assault and a previous alleged rape, an executive directive should be issued to all Department of Social Welfare districts and institutions to not allow children and young people in care to go to Whakapakari. Starck wrote: “Further to this from my own perspective I cannot allow this Department to allow Youths attending camps to be subjected to the Whakapakari Justice as it is dispensed by way of banishment to the island called ‘Alcatraz’.”[321] This recommendation was not followed. Children and young people continued to be placed at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme and sent to Alcatraz as punishment.
1994 Topzand Report: allegations of violence, inadequate food, unsafe boating practices
201. On 24 May 1994, five social work staff visited Whakapakari to investigate concerns raised after eight young people escaped. The visit resulted in a report by Acting Social Work Supervisor Peter Topzand.[322] In the report the children and young people complained of violence and standover tactics by staff and other young people, inadequate provision of food, substandard sleeping arrangements, a lack of first aid facilities and unsafe boating practices. The young people interviewed consistently described unhygienic conditions and how the environment was worse when John da Silva was not on the island.[323]
202. Two large calibre rifles at Whakapakari were a major red flag, however the visiting social work staff were satisfied by storage arrangements and an assurance provided that only John da Silva would use the firearms.[324] However, the 1992 documentary Breaking the Barrier showed someone other than John da Silva using firearms. Children and young people had also complained of rape and mock executions by supervisors wielding guns. Given the problems with violence, threats and intimidation the social workers were alerted to during this visit, not doing more to ensure gun safety represented a major safeguarding failure. Much of the abuse could have been avoided if the State had undertaken the most basic and obvious monitoring exercise of ensuring that young people were not supervised by armed staff.
203. The report noted that almost all the young people interviewed were in fear of one supervisor, whom they had seen “threaten, assault and intimidate other residents, or who had been his victims themselves.”[325] The female interviewees stated he called them derogatory names such as ‘slut’ or ‘bitch’.[326] The social workers who visited the island believed that one boy should lay a complaint with police about the supervisor, but could not be expected to do so because he had six weeks remaining where he would continue to be exposed to him. It appears nobody considered removing him.
204. The investigation included interviews with the local constable, a Department of Conservation officer, a retired policeman, a general practitioner, and a public health nurse who all spoke of the violent treatment of young people and the poor standards of hygiene and accommodation at the camp. The local constable raised concerns about consistent allegations of physical abuse, the quality and quantity of food, the lack of boat safety and the “ritualised abuse” when young people ran away.[327] He also described the conditions as dirty and that he “would not put a dog there.”[328] Despite acknowledging the abuse of children and young people on the programme it does not seem that the constable escalated these concerns or conducted further investigation, which represents another monitoring failure of a state agency.
205. The report determined that the allegations made by the boys who ran were “largely untrue”.[329] This is despite young people and NZ Police raising serious issues such as a lack of food, cold and wet sleeping conditions and difficult physical labour. The recommendations it made were at best tokenistic, such as better access to first aid and communication, locking the boats up when not in use, and that better clothing could be made available. This amounted to a serious monitoring failure given survivors directly disclosed abuse to the report writers and this was acknowledged within the report.
206. The report did concede that having children and young people in an isolated environment where they were in fear of a supervisor was emotional abuse. However, despite this conclusion and the physical abuse allegations, the report only recommended an urgent review of the supervisor’s involvement in the programme rather than his removal entirely.[330] After the report was published Te Whakapakari Youth Trust refuted the suggestion that the supervisor’s involvement be reviewed, stating that they fully supported him, and that the matter had been dealt with internally.[331]
207. In response to the reported allegations the Community Funding Agency reviewed its approval of Te Whakapakari Youth Trust. The report observed that there was a wider issue of recruiting supervisors but argued that the Trust had made improvements in terms of safety and communication.[332] The report recommended that the Community Funding Agency continue with its full approval, with a further review in three months’ time.[333]
208. In October 1994, the Community Funding Agency granted continued approval with conditions that Te Whakapakari Youth Trust upgrade its performance in meeting academic needs, clothing provision and general staff training. A review was planned for December 1994 to ensure these conditions had been met, but by September 1995 there was no evidence this had taken place.[334]
1995 Thom Report: allegations of assault, food, medical needs and hygiene
209. On 11 August 1995 a former Whakapakari supervisor wrote to the Minister of Social Welfare raising serious concerns about the programme, including the provision of rotten food, rat-infested tents, a lack of first aid equipment, an assault of a young person by another supervisor, and another young person being severely beaten by a group of boys.[335] A girl also made complaints of violence towards the females at Whakaparkari.
210. In response to these complaints practice consultant Alison Thom carried out structured interviews with four boys who had previously been at Whakapakari and published a report with her findings on 18 September 1995.[336] No girls were interviewed, despite the allegation of violence towards females, and no staff members were interviewed.
211. The report concluded that the conditions at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme were substandard, including issues with food,[337] medical needs[338] and personal hygiene.[339] Ms Thom recommended that the Children and Young Persons Service withdraw all young people from the camp and cease referrals until the matters in the report had been addressed.[340] The Thom Report referenced ‘Alcatraz’, with one boy reporting that he had to sleep in water but made no comment about its existence as an element of the programme.[341]
212. After meeting with representatives from Te Whakapakari Youth Trust to discuss the Thom Report, Children and Young Persons Service Area Manager Betty MacClaren declined to implement the report’s recommendations and was satisfied the Trust should continue with the programme, with stricter assessment and referral criteria, particularly for care and protection cases.[342] Girls continued to be sent to the programme until the following year, when a staff member was alleged to be engaged with unlawful sexual connection with a former female resident.[343]
1996 Eggleston Review
213. In 1996, Erin Eggleston, a senior psychologist conducting research for Massey University, wrote a positive review of the programme in the Community Mental Health in New Zealand journal. The article was based on a month-long visit to the programme in 1993 and follow up interviews with 10 participants one year later. It noted the outdoor environment, physical activity and emphasis on Māori culture enabled participants to gain experience to help them in the real world.[344]
214. Eggleston reported that participants looked back favourably on their time at Whakapakari and noted six of seven Māori participants on the programme became more involved in their culture after returning.[345] However, even though the programme described itself as having a kaupapa Māori approach, there was an absence of cultural monitoring to ensure that it was providing this kind of care.
215. A version of this review was also published in 2000 in the Social Policy Journal of New Zealand. Social workers and the Department of Social Welfare relied heavily on this review and used it to demonstrate the positive attributes of Te Whakapakari Youth Programme.[346] In 2018 it was also cited by a police detective considering a survivor’s historic complaint of rape by John da Silva, which was not prosecuted.[347] It could be asked whether the presence of an external adult and researcher such as Eggleston may have reduced the likelihood of abuse being perpetrated, witnessed or disclosed while she was there, given the no-narking culture.
216. In December 1996, the Community Funding Agency renewed its approval of section 396 status for Te Whakapakari Youth Trust despite the past allegations of violence and poor conditions.
1997 Green Report: Allegations of assault, sexual abuse and unhygienic conditions
217. In March 1997, a young person made allegations of abuse by a staff member at Whakapakari. A file note of the incident suggested he may have made the allegation “with a manipulative view”.[348] Wilhelmina da Silva told a social worker investigating the incident that the staff member was no longer working there, and that the young person’s behaviour consistently failed to meet the desired standard. She expressed a view that “it may be in his interests for his tenure at Whakapakari to be extended as a consequence”.[349]
218. When social workers interviewed the young person, he said he had complained to Wilhelmina da Silva who said, “it’s only a scratch, it [doesn’t] really matter, it happens all the time,” and refused his requests to ring his mother or social worker. The resident also told social workers that staff intercepted mail from young people to their families who complained of abuse, and in one instance burned a letter in front of the young person who wrote it.[350] The young person’s mother told the Children, Young Persons and their Families Service that after she had reported the abuse to them Mrs da Silva had phoned her and was angry she had reported her son’s complaint. In response the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service extended the complainant’s stay for a further month appearing to take Mrs da Silva’s word over the child and his mother’s.[351]
219. A few months later in June, another mother contacted the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service after two young people assaulted her son. A supervisor reported that they took place while the boys were serving “penalty time” on Alcatraz:
“The assaults which occurred twice were of a particularly serious nature one holding the victim whilst the other delivered blows to the head and body. The terrain is steep rocky with 100 foot sheer drops.”[352]
220. John da Silva confirmed the assault had taken place and the two young people had been expelled from the programme. However, there was no subsequent referral to NZ Police or steps taken to remove the victim from Whakapakari despite his mother’s plea to do so.[353]
221. Around the same time a second-year social work student made complaints to the Child, Young Persons and Their Families Service about the unhygienic conditions of the camp, the poor provision of shelter and the young age of some of the residents. Senior outreach worker for the Community Funding Agency, Michael Mills, disputed some of these claims and recommended the programme should continue in its “present form.”[354] When four further allegations of physical and sexual abuse came to light, Mills continued to advise that there was no risk to children and young people on the programme “that would warrant a suspension and/or removal of the current residents.”[355] The national manager of care and residential services, Janet Worfolk, disagreed with this assessment and asked that an immediate practice review take place.[356] This was undertaken by Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service Senior Advisory Officer Patty Green.[357]
222. The Green Report described allegations of physical and sexual abuse, as well as the practice of sending young people to Alcatraz as a form of discipline when camp rules were breached.[358] The report concluded:
“The camp has a clear policy that physical discipline and abuse is not acceptable. It must be stressed, however, that these young people can be highly demanding and manipulative and that in view of the difficult behaviour of these youngsters, it is not surprising that the occasional incident occurs. Staff cited an incident when a young person lost his temper and assaulted a staff member with an iron bar, and the subsequent difficulty in restraining this young man.”[359]
223. The report recommended that the health worker who visited the camp weekly should check on the children and young people and any injuries sustained: “This would assist in minimising the possibility of any false allegations being made after a young person is discharged.”[360] The same report noted that young people could exaggerate the difficulties they encountered on the programme “as a form of bravado.”[361]
224. The report raised issues about the use of peer pressure as a formal means of controlling behaviour;[362] lack of staff training[363] and police checks on staff prior to appointment;[364] and lack of procedures and policies including accident and incident reporting, and a policy for investigating disclosures of abuse.[365] The report did not record or recommend any referrals to police to investigate these concerns.
225. Prior to releasing the report, the report writer Patty Green wrote to John and Wilhelmina da Silva in terms that reinforced the view she expressed in the report:[366]
“Just wanted to keep you informed on progress. I am hopeful we may be able to get many of the issues resolved to make your lives a little easier.”
226. This demonstrated that Child, Youth and Family had entrenched negative views towards young people in social welfare care settings and were reluctant to make findings that abuse had occurred.
227. In October 1997, the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service wrote to John da Silva about the Green Report. Despite the findings, the letter said: “It needs to be recognised that your programme is valuable to us and we will work with you to resolve the problems that have arisen.”[367] There is no suggestion that the State would cease its support of the programme.
228. On 2 March 1998, the Community Funding Agency confirmed approval status for Te Whakapakari Youth Trust, following an inspection of the camp, a review of a sample of client files, examination of audited accounts and addressing with the Trust matters raised in the 1997 Green Report.[368]
May 1998: John da Silva hands over four young people to a gang member for retribution
229. On 11 May 1998, a social worker recorded a phone call with John da Silva, in which he said four young people had taken a boat belonging to a leader of the Head Hunters gang.[369] On 20 May 1998, John da Silva wrote that in relation to the “attempted conversion of the fishing boat the four were organised to work for the owner and clean up his section.”[370]
230. On 14 August 1998 a supervisor contacted the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service on behalf of himself and two other staff members, and complained about the mock execution of young boys described earlier in this case study by David Bagley.[371] This prompted an investigation conducted by Haahi Walker, an outreach worker for the Community Funding Agency, and Rob Harper, a staff member from the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service national office.[372] They did not speak with David Bagley nor make any attempt to contact him. The NZ Police tried to contact David for a statement but he was too scared to provide one because the man who had the gun had written down David’s address when he was with him.[373]
231. One young person was evidentially interviewed and corroborated the account given by the supervisors. Despite this, Rob Harper reported the response of John and Wilhelmina da Silva that the man was not a gang member (notwithstanding John da Silva’s comment to the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service on 11 May 1998 that he was), that the work done on the man’s property by the young people was arranged by NZ Police and that John da Silva was unaware of the alleged incidents. [374]
232. The same report noted that there was no police involvement in the incident.[375] After reporting the da Silvas’ response to the allegations, the report reached no factual findings on these issues or in fact whether the complaint occurred. It recommended that the complainants be advised that their concerns had been fully investigated, and that although there were concerns about the harsh environment, it was felt that with adequate support, the programme maintained its viability.[376]
233. Further, the report recommended that NZ Police be notified that the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service had investigated the complaints made and concluded “there are no immediate safety issues” for those at Whakapakari.[377] A covering letter to Te Whakapakari Youth Trust from the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service noted that the investigation had been carried out and they could find “nothing to substantiate the allegations”.[378]
234. Mr Harper made recommendations including that Te Whakapakari Youth Trust be directed to stop using ‘Alcatraz’ as a means of discipline and that young people were to be given appropriate provisions.[379] Harper’s report represented a serious monitoring failure, particularly in light of the fact that three staff had complained about what had occurred, and an evidential interview had been given by one of the young people involved. The lack of referral to police for investigation also represents a serious failure.
235. Unsatisfied with the outcome, Gagaj Sau Gibson Lagfatmaro, the same supervisor who had been present with John da Silva when the young people escaped, complained to the Children’s Commissioner Roger McClay. The Commissioner sought information from the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service and NZ Police in January 1999.[380]
236. On 2 March 1999, Acting General Manager Ken Rand responded to the Children’s Commissioner and repeated John da Silva’s version of events. He also repeated that the police had arranged for the young people to work for reparation, although the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service had not confirmed that with NZ Police.[381]
237. On 24 May 1999, NZ Police provided a report by the officer stationed at Great Barrier Island, who stated that he did not arrange for any work to be done for the boat owner by the young people involved in this complaint, and that in all the time on the island, he never organised for Whakapakari youths to do community work.[382]
238. On 12 July 1999, the Children’s Commissioner wrote to the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service noting the serious discrepancies between the information provided by complainants and the NZ Police report. Mr McClay wrote:
“These initial findings call into question not only the integrity of the investigation completed by CYPFA but also that of the programme directors, Willie and John da Silva. Although Ken Rand states that the team found them to be deeply committed to providing an alternative to the Justice system for troubled youth and that all contracted care standards were assessed as being met, our complainants suggest that they used tactics of intimidation and silencing not only on the young people but also on their staff. Our complainants state that the CYPFA / CFA investigation team did not interview any young people or supervisors but spoke only with John and Willie da Silva.” [383]
239. The report also claimed that children and young people on the island were being subjected to “cruel and inhuman treatment”, and that the director of the programme was aware of and encouraged that treatment.[384] The Children’s Commissioner asked that Whakapakari be urgently reviewed to assess its compliance with legislative and operational requirements. NZ Police decided not to prosecute based on what they saw as substandard evidence and the “unreliable” and “unco-operative” nature of the four boys.[385]
240. On 6 December 1999, Child, Youth and Family Service General Manager Jackie Brown responded, stating that she did not think another review would serve any useful purpose because the complaints by the staff had not been confirmed by “previous enquiries”. Ms Brown added:
“I think we can safely say that the almost complete lack of co-operation from the four youths in the investigation of the allegations clearly demonstrates their very selective attitude towards attempts to get to the truth of the matter.”[386]
241. Journalist Matt Nippert wrote, however, that the 1998 investigation report in response to this infamous ‘grave digging’ incident, failed to interview either the boys involved in the incident or the whistle-blowing staff member, and instead the explanation by John da Silva was accepted and preferred.[387]
242. The Children’s Commissioner’s final report indicated concern at the refusal of the Child, Youth and Family Service[388] to provide a review of the programme at his request, as well as the approach taken by NZ Police to the incident. He also observed Child, Youth and Family Service’s justification that the young people who attended Whakapakari were some of the most:
“‘disturbed anti-social youths’ ... That, however, does not give anyone the right to treat them inhumanely or cruelly. If the allegations are correct, then both the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act, 1989 have been breached.”[389]
2003: Allegations of assault
243. In 2003, the Child, Youth and Family Service visited Whakapakari after a boy suffered a fractured shoulder. This injury went undetected for six days until the boy left Whakapakari and saw a doctor, who arranged for an x-ray. Te Whakapakari Youth Programme had conflicting notes as to how this injury happened, but an eyewitness said a supervisor intervened in a fight between two young people. The injured boy was lifted off the other boy and fell heavily against a rough wall. Staff advised the Child, Youth and Family Service assessor that the young person would “play on his injuries” so staff assumed he was not badly injured.[390] As a result, the Child, Youth and Family Service determined that Te Whakapakari Youth Trust was unable to meet the standard that ensured that young people were safe and cared for.
244. In the same year an assessment to determine whether Te Whakapakari Youth Trust met the section 396 Standards for Approval noted there was no clear policy or procedure for dealing with external or internal complaints, and in this instance, no set steps were in place to manage this situation where a young person had suffered a serious injury.[391]
245. Despite finding that the Standards for Approval had not been met in a number of respects, the assessor recommended that approval should continue for Te Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service under section 396, on the condition that the Trust address remedial actions over the following year.[392]
246. Later in the year, in October 2003, a supervisor hit a boy in the head with a stick when he overheard them discussing plans to escape. The cut required stitches and after a year-long investigation the supervisor pled guilty to common assault and was discharged without a conviction.[393]
2004: Allegations of physical abuse and closure of programme
247. In February 2004, a young man due to be placed at Whakapakari made a complaint after he heard participants were routinely “given the bash”. This prompted an investigation where eight other young people provided similar allegations of systemic abuse, including physical abuse by staff, young people being afraid to make complaints, normalisation of violence as part of the programme, and sexual abuse and innuendo by staff. On 11 March 2004 the investigation team recommended all young people be removed from Whakapakari and funding for the programme was suspended four days later.[394]
248. Fifteen young people subsequently disclosed abuse, saying they had either been subjected to or witnessed serious sexual and physical assaults by Te Whakapakari Youth Programme staff. A NZ Police investigation ensued, which indicated two former staff members might face related charges.[395] The Inquiry received evidence that one person pleaded guilty to one charge of common assault, and was discharged without conviction.[396]
249. A special assessment report dated 21 June 2004 concluded Te Whakapakari Youth Trust was in breach of several standards it was required to adhere to as a Child and Family Support Service, including outdated key operating policies, incomplete complaints procedures, staff training issues and the failure to meet the requirement that staff be vetted by police. It found that policy and procedures regarding discipline and the use of restraint in particular were inadequate (as they had been in the 1997 Green Report).[397] However, it concluded that the minimum standards for health and safety were met, despite the issues that were raised. It recommended that the Trust have its approval status put on hold until it could address the findings of the report. No allegations were referred to NZ Police.
250. A memorandum in October of the same year recorded the views of an Auckland region manager regarding a potential reopening of Whakapakari:
“I am absolutely opposed to Whakapakari reopening. My opposition to this is a philosophical one as much as anything. The ‘out of sight, out of mind’ approach that occurs when placements are made to Whakapakari does not equal a quality social work service. We cannot fulfil our obligations to visit kids in care every two months if they are placed in a remote area like Whakapakari.”[398]
2005: Consideration of a revised programme by Child, Youth and Family Service
251. In June 2005, the Child, Youth and Family Service considered offering support and funding for the Whakapakari Youth Trust to revise its programme. There were key concerns around substantiated allegations of violence by workers against young people, poor supervision of social work practice, poor review and monitoring of the young persons’ plans and poor monitoring and evaluation of the programme.[399]
252. The Child, Youth and Family Service funded more than $200,000 for Te Whakapakari Youth Trust to redesign its programme, partly due to the lack of other residential programmes for youth offenders. However, in March 2006 the Child, Youth and Family Service ended negotiations for the redesign, citing reasons including “the lengthy history of abuse allegations, questionable learning by the trust from these incidents and the previous programme content not being supported by research” and “the capacity of the department to support the programme being exacerbated by the isolated location”. It concluded that the risk of further abuse was too great.[400] Many instances of abuse could have been prevented if this conclusion had been reached and acted on when allegations first emerged more than 10 years earlier.
253. A 2008 Child, Youth and Family Service internal background note on the programme took an almost dismissive approach towards these allegations, emphasising several times that the repeated allegations could not be corroborated or substantiated, with the exception of those in 2004, after which the programme was suspended immediately. The report said: “It would be unwise to associate events in 2004 with any of the previous allegations or investigations in the 1990s.”[401] The report also failed to mention the 2003 response to allegations of physical abuse causing a fractured shoulder.[402] This note underscores the state’s pattern of dismissing and denying many allegations of abuse at Whakapakari. It shows no accountability on the part of the Department of Social Welfare and its successors for what happened to the children and young people in their care.
NZ Police failed to properly investigate allegations of sexual abuse by John da Silva in 2017
254. In 2017, a former young person complained to NZ police that John da Silva had raped him in 1998. Records confirm that the young person was at Whakapakari at the time. NZ Police declined to charge John da Silva after the detective investigating the matter concluded that there was insufficient evidence. Although the young person who made the allegation named a number of witnesses,[403] NZ Police did not interview them. Instead, NZ Police read the 1996 review of Whakapakari by Massey University researcher Erin Eggleston and said: “This article was written by someone who attended the camp and had seen first-hand the kindness and dedication both John and Wilhelmina Da Silva showed to the young people attending.”[404]
255. On the basis of explanations given by the da Silvas, which were not independently confirmed, NZ Police concluded that there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s account. For example, the former young person had identified a staff member who was a supervisor with one arm, when asked about this man, John da Silva said he could not remember him and that “it would be very unusual for a camp leader to have one arm as they would not be able to participate in the activities”[405] Wilhelmina da Silva said she knew the man but he was not a staff member, rather a “member of the public who used to come over and speak to the boys”.[406] Further evidence supports the complainant’s claim, for example, Māori survivor Mr LR (Ngāi Te Rangi, Ngāpuhi, Tainui) who was at Whakapakari in 1999 said there was a staff member with one arm who went by a similar name.[407] Survivor Mr PJ, who was at Whakapakari in 2003, described a man with one arm and a similar name who was a board member and was living at Whakapakari at that time.[408] Māori survivor Mr SL (Tainui) described being sexually assaulted in 1993 by a supervisor with the same name as the person identified by Mr LR.[409]
256. NZ Police commented on the existence of civil claims against the Ministry of Social Development, framing the abuse disclosures as incidental and as unfortunate for John da Silva’s reputation, rather than acknowledging the very real harm that had been done to children and young people:
“As a result of this the good work the Da Silvas did with hundreds of young people has been tainted by complaints made against the camp ... This has, understandably, put a great deal of stress on the Da Silva family over the past 14 years.”[410]
257. The report concludes: “It may be possible that this event was fabricated by [name] in the hope of also receiving some form of compensation from the Government.”[411] There is no reference in the NZ Police report to the fact that John da Silva was previously charged with rape, although that appeared on the NZ Police database.[412] John da Silva had been acquitted of this charge.
258. This report illustrates the resistance against holding abusers to account for abuse in social welfare care settings. Even when the substantial barriers to making a complaint were overcome and a complaint was made to NZ Police, they failed to properly investigate the allegations.
Failure to provide oversight and monitoring to ensure safety of children
259. The State did not meet its own requirements for social workers to visit on a six-weekly basis. The Thom Report noted referring social workers believed Community Funding Agency approval negated the need for them to perform a placement assessment. The report noted that the Community Funding Agency considered it had met its monitoring obligations by visiting Whakapakari twice per year, by appointment.[413] The fact that monitoring was so infrequent and scheduled meant that the true circumstances of neglect, abuse and violence were successfully concealed.
260. Survivors also told the Inquiry they had little to no social worker contact while on the island.[414] Māori survivor Mr FQ’s social worker only called him once in the entire time he was at Whakapakari, and spoke to Wilhelmina da Silva rather than him.[415] NZ European survivor Scott Carr, who suffered significant abuse while at Whakapakari, told the Inquiry:
“I also never saw my social worker after he dropped me off at Whakapakari. He called me once, on 19 October 1998, and spoke to the supervisor, who told my social worker that I was ‘doing well and fitting into the programme’.”[416]
261. Anthea Raven was employed in Auckland by the Department of Social Welfare and its successors as a frontline social worker between 1985 and 2001. She described social workers being aware of many allegations about Whakapakari, and though they were investigated they “seemed to get covered over and the kids would remain”.[417] Ms Raven and her colleagues discussed and reported the lack of accountability and oversight, but observed no action was taken unless there was media interest.[418]
262. There were also significant red flags in the medical notes of young people that showed a lack of medical care and neglect of hygiene. Survivor Mr PJ’s medical records indicated boils on his legs, arm, chest, neck and face, infected scratches, an ulcer, and an injury to his right fist.[419]
263. In September 1990 John da Silva was charged with raping a woman three months earlier, but was acquitted on 13 December 1990.[420] This charge does not appear to have been disclosed to the Department of Social Welfare, nor is it mentioned in any of the subsequent investigations that were conducted in relation to allegations of abuse. However, had John da Silva been vetted, police records would have demonstrated that he had been charged with rape and his suitability to direct the programme should then have been investigated.
264. There is clear evidence the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services and its predecessors knew of the use of Alcatraz as an extreme form of solitary confinement for a period of 16 years before the programme shut down. The 1998 annual approval report confirming Te Whakapakari Youth Trust’s continued section 396 approval and funding observed: “There is on-going debate over the periodic use of ‘Alcatraz’ for extreme situations.”[421] The Inquiry was unable to find evidence that the Department considered the legality of this practice or determined whether it complied with care standards.
265. In a 1998 interview regarding a complaint, John da Silva said he had used the punishment for the 21 years of the programme’s existence, and with departmental knowledge. He further mentioned he was happy to stop using the island if Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service wished, and when young people broke the rules he would simply send them home.[422] However, despite repeated complaints about Alcatraz, and repeated directives from the Department of Social Welfare head office in Wellington, and its successors, dating from at least 1988 up to 2004, the practice of sending participants to the island as a punishment continued.[423]
The State continued to fund Te Whakapakari Youth Programme despite investigating allegations of abuse for 14 years
266. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 required approval of the Director-General of Social Welfare of any organisation seeking to provide residential care as a Child and Family Support Service for the purposes of the Act.[424] The Director-General could not give approval unless, after making enquiries, it was satisfied that the organisation was suitable to act as the custodian or guardian of children and young persons, and capable of exercising the powers, duties and functions of a Child and Support Service.[425]
267. From 1992 the approvals function was carried out by the Community Funding Agency.[426] The Community Funding Agency required a programme provider such as Te Whakapakari Youth Trust to meet Community Funding Agency Level 1 standards to provide funded residential care.[427] These standards included “intake, placement, quality of care, personnel and management.”[428] The Department of Social Welfare had referred young people to the programme prior to this approval process. Evidence received by the Inquiry shows referrals were made at least from 1989.
268. From 1992 to 1999, approval as a section 396 provider was primarily based within the funding agreements between the provider and the Community Funding Agency. The Community Funding Agency had only some staff with social work experience and backgrounds, who were ill-equipped to assess compliance. Generally, the Community Funding Agency encouraged the development of new, culturally appropriate services.[429]
269. Proposed providers had to prepare a set of written materials, which were evaluated against Community Funding Agency standards. Outreach workers visited the proposed provider and spoke to staff. Level 1 standards included:
- Standard 10 – Provision of Care: All organisations have procedures which ensure that the care provided for children and young persons meets their individual needs for safety and nurture.
- Standard 11 – Discipline: Children and young persons are not physically punished or disciplined or treated in a way that is degrading or humiliating or causes unreasonable fear or anxiety.[430]
270. Te Whakapakari Youth Trust was first approved in 1990 as a Child and Family Support Service pursuant to section 396 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989.[431]
271. A previous National Operations Manager for the Community Funding Agency identified isolated services such as Te Whakapakari Youth Programme and Moerangi Treks as “the most risky kind of service”.[432] A Community Funding Agency outreach worker said in 1995 that he believed more isolated programmes such as Whakapakari did not receive the equivalent service from the Community Funding Agency as the more accessible agencies.[433] The Community Funding Agency conducted two monitoring visits per year, but these were made by appointment.
272. Te Kāhui Kahu accepted that its predecessor the Community Funding Agency lacked cultural capability and robust standards for assessing whether providers could comply with te Tiriti obligations and prove cultural competency around drew on tikanga Māori.[434] Māori survivor Cody Togo (Ngāti Rangi, Tainui) told the Inquiry:
“While we engaged with Māori culture and practices, there was nothing tikanga about this programme. There is absolutely nothing in tikanga that permits children to be treated how we were. We were treated like little prisoners and pieces of dirt.”[435]
273. Despite confusion between the Community Funding Agency and Child, Youth and Family Service about which agency was responsible for vetting,[436] the Community Funding Agency was aware of ongoing investigations and reports about Whakapakari. For example, in a letter to the Service, the agency detailed discussions with Whakapakari after a supervisor was charged with unlawful sexual connection with a female young person who had attended the programme. This letter also makes reference to the 1995 Topzand Report in relation to a complaint made by a former staff member of Whakapakari.[437]
274. Barry Fisk of the Ministry of Social Development told the Inquiry that the Community Funding Agency completed assessments of Te Whakapakari Youth Programme in February 1999 and November 2001. No documents were identified that refer to any concerns or suspension from an approval perspective during those assessments.[438]
275. The approval status for Te Whakapakari Youth Trust was suspended in 2004 after allegations of physical abuse by staff. From that point, all referrals to the programme ceased. As noted above, the Child, Youth and Family Service then worked with Te Whakapakari Youth Trust board to consider whether the Trust could redesign the programme to meet practice standards that were a prerequisite for approval. In March 2006, the Child, Youth and Family Service and the trust board agreed to cease all contractual relationships.[439]
276. The fact that the Community Funding Agency continued to fund Te Whakapakari Youth Trust despite the numerous Child, Youth and Family Service and its predecessor reports in relation to serious allegations of neglect and physical and sexual abuse represents a serious safeguarding failure.
Conclusion on the structural, systemic and practical issues that caused or contributed to abuse at Whakapakari
277. Underpinning all of the structural and systemic factors that contributed to the ongoing abuse is the reprehensible attitude to children and young people who were sent there. They were blamed for abuse and seen as unworthy of proper care and protection.
278. The comprehensive regulations that afforded safeguarding measures from 1997 did not apply to the programme.[440] They applied only to residences that were directly operated by the State.
279. There were numerous barriers to making complaints about abuse: there were no social worker visits, the supervisors intercepted children and young people’s mail and survivors were threatened by supervisors to deter them from making complaints.
280. When survivors did complain, they were either not believed or complaints were not adequately and fairly investigated. The Department of Social Welfare and its successors received numerous allegations of serious abuse between 1989 until 2004 and again in 2017. A recommendation by the Department of Social Welfare in 1989 that no more children and young people be referred to Whakapakari was not acted on.
281. Despite knowing of serious allegations of abuse throughout this period, the Department of Social Welfare and its successors, and other government departments, continued to fund Te Whakapakari Youth Programme to have the care of vulnerable children and young people.
Societal factors that caused or contributed to abuse and neglect
Negative attitudes to children and young people
282. The prevailing attitude of the State towards children and young people placed at Te Whakapakari Youth Programme is clear in the numerous reports and reviews. Children and young people were perceived to be ‘tough’,[441] requiring discipline, and prone to making false complaints. Children and young people were framed as problematic, and blamed for abuse rather than acknowledging how abuse had prompted ‘difficult’ behaviour. Children and young people in care were afforded a low status and seen as unworthy of proper care and protection.
283. The 1992 documentary Breaking the Barrier strengthened these negative attitudes towards children and young people in care. In the documentary’s opening minutes, the narrator noted the criminal offending of many children and young people sent to Whakapakari: “These are bad kids.” It also featured a number of incidents that did not, but should have, caused concern. A 13-year-old boy had an obvious injury to his chin and upper lip and was bandaged; the narrator said he had been kicked in the teeth within a few days of arrival. John da Silva was shown telling supervisors that they should not be punching the young people on the programme.
284. The documentary also featured a caption: “Not everyone is happy. Some will do anything to get away from Whakapakari.” It showed one boy, ‘Rat’ who “has taken the extraordinary step of circumcising himself”. John da Silva asked a supervisor as to how the boy got a knife and called someone on the mainland to ask if Rat subsequently said why he cut himself. However, no questions were raised as to why a young person might go to the length of circumcising himself to escape Whakapakari. Despite these obvious red flags, there was no discussion or concern expressed within the documentary for the safety of young people. It also appears that the documentary did not cause alarm or complaints at the treatment of the children from those viewing at home, which speaks to the general societal attitude towards children and young people considered delinquent.
285. Some children and young people also attempted to escape from the island, sometimes through drastic action. While Māori survivor Cody Togo (Ngāti Rangi, Tainui) was on the programme, a boy drank a cleaning product in the hope he would be removed.[442] Yet attempts to escape simply resulted in young people being labelled as ‘troubled’, and often their time on the island was extended if they tried to abscond.
286. In a 2008 Listener article by journalist Matt Nippert, an ex-police constable for Great Barrier Island is quoted as saying “some terrible kids were sent there” as a way of explaining the violence that took place.[443] Although there was abuse between the children and young people on the programme, they were not the only perpetrators and often the abuse was instigated at the hands of the staff.
Racism
287. The Inquiry heard that institutional, cultural, and personal racism directly contributed to survivors, and in particular Māori and Pacific survivors, entering Whakapakari and suffering abuse and neglect in care.
288. Throughout the Inquiry period this could be seen in “the prevailing deficit views of Māori as lazy, dependents of the state, incapable of providing the right family environment for their children”.[444]
289. Whakapakari also failed to consistently and meaningfully ensure that Pacific children, young people and adults in care had adequate access to their culture, identity, language and communities.[445]
Discrimination against people experiencing poverty
290. Throughout the Inquiry period there were negative stereotypes about poverty and welfare. Poverty was seen as a problem with individuals rather than an outcome of wider social, economic, and political circumstances.
291. People experiencing poverty and deprivation were more likely to be taken into Whakapakari and to be abused and neglected while in care. Some survivors recall being identified as “welfare children” and “welfare rats”.[446]
Buildings and a rope swing at Whakapakari[447]
Timeline of abuse at Whakapakari
- 23 June 1989 - Camp supervisor and six other young people assault another boy at Whakapakari
- 19 July 1989 - Staff member from Ōwairaka Boys’ Home recommends all referrals to Whakapakari should stop.
- 1992 – Breaking the Barrier documentary shows staff using firearms
- 1993 – Erin Eggleston, researcher for Massey University visits Whakapakari for a month
- 24 May 1994 - Topzand visit and report notes allegations of violence, inadequate food and unsafe boating practices.
- October 1994 - Community Funding Agency granted continued approval of Whakapakari
- 18 September 1995 – Thom Report finds conditions at Whakapakari were substandard, including issues with food, medical needs and personal hygiene. Recommends that all young people are withdrawn and referrals stop until matters addressed.
- 1996 – Eggleston wites a positive review of the programme in the Community Mental Health in New Zealand journal.
- December 1996 - Community Funding Agency renewed its approval of section 396 status for Te Whakapakari Youth Programme despite the past allegations of violence and poor conditions.
- 1 February 1997 - Children, Young Persons and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996 provided a set of care standards for those in residences operated by the State.
- March 1997 – Young person makes allegations of abuse by a staff member. In response the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service extended the complainant’s stay for a further month.
- June 1997 – The mother of a young person reports to Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service that her son was assaulted. No referral was made to police and the victim was not removed despite mother’s pleas.
- June 1997 – Second year social work student makes complaint about conditions at the camp. Community Funding Agency disputes claims and recommends programme continues. Four further complaints of physical and sexual abuse lead to practice review.
- September 1997 – Green Report demonstrates negative views towards young people and reluctance to make findings that abuse had occurred.
- October 1997 - Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service write to John da Silva expressing continued support for the programme.
- 2 March 1998 – Community Funding Agency confirms approval status
- May 1998 – John da Silva hands over four young people to a gang member for retribution
- 14 August 1998 – supervisor complains about the mock execution of young boys. Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service finds “no immediate safety issues”. Same supervisor then complains to Children’s Commissioner.
- January 1999 – Children’s Commissioner requests information from NZ Police and Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service.
- 12 July 1999 - Children’s Commissioner’s report questions integrity of earlier investigations and seeks urgent review of Whakapakari.
- 6 December 1999 - Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service refuses to review Whakapakari.
- 2003 – Assessor recommends approval of Whakapakari as a section 396 provider should continue despite not meeting care standards.
- October 2003 – Supervisor hits boy in the head with a stick. Supervisor pleads guilty and is discharged without conviction.
- February 2004 – Investigation into Whakapakari following complaints of abuse.
- 11 March 2004 – Investigation team recommends all young people be removed from Whakapakari.
- 15 March 2004 – Te Whakapakari Youth Programme is suspended
- 21 June 2004 – Special assessment report finds Te Whakapakari Youth Programme was in breach of several standards.
- October 2004 – Memo from regional manager opposing reopening of Whakapakari
- 2005 - Internal memorandum conceded that there had been substantiated allegations of violence against young people by staff, and poor monitoring of the programme.
- June 2005 - Child, Youth and Family Service considers offering support and funding for Whakapakari to revise its programme
- March 2006 - Child, Youth and Family Service ends negotiations concluding risk of further abuse was too great.
Footnotes
[252] Mr PJ disclosed a rape by supervisor in 2003 to John and Wilhelmina da Silva, who took no action, in Witness statement of Mr PJ (9 November 2021, paras 152–158).
[253] Nippert, M, “Escape from ‘Alcatraz’: What really happened to boys sent to a boot camp on a remote island?”, New Zealand Listener (20 September 2008, page 28).
[254] An instance of a social worker failing to properly address a complaint is noted below at paragraph 153, Internal Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service email to Grey Lynn Manager Jessie Henderson (10 July 1997).
[255] See for example: Witness statements of Mr NQ (13 April 2023, para 4.4) and Michael Bennett (23 January 2023, paras 184–188); Child, Young Persons and Their Families Service, Notes of interview of with [resident], re: Alleged physical abuse at Whakapakari (27 August 1997); Internal Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service email to Grey Lynn Manager Jessie Henderson (10 July 1997).
[256] Child, Youth and Family Service, Summary report for Whakapakari for section 396 approval (14 May 2003, page 3).
[257] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 12), Appendix 5 interview notes with Great Barrier constable.
[258] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 7).
[259] File note re complaint by social work student following visit to Whakapakari (11 and 14 July 1997).
[260] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 21).
[261] Ngā Taonga, Breaking the barrier (Living Pictures, 1992), https://www.ngataonga.org.nz/search-use-collection/search/TZP102549/.
[262] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 21).
[263] Hewitt, W, Special assessment report of Whakapakari Youth Trust (21 June 2004, page 10).
[264] Hewitt, W, Special assessment report of Whakapakari Youth Trust (21 June 2004, page 10).
[265] Hewitt, W, Special assessment report of Whakapakari Youth Trust (21 June 2004, page 10).
[266] Witness statement of Jason Fenton (15 April 2022, paras 4.27–4.28, 4.34–4.35).
[267] Child, Youth and Family Services email re: Whakapakari abuse allegation (10 April 2003, page 1).
[268] Whakapakari Youth Programme 15 Report (6–30 June 1989).
[269] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 4.5).
[270] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 26).
[271] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 27).
[272] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 5).
[273] Witness statement of Scott Carr (7 March 2021)
[274] Private session transcript of survivor who wishes to remain anonymous (21 January, pages 12–13
[275] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994).
[276] Letter from mother of child at Whakapakari to Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service (6 June 1997); Report from Whakapakari re: assault on [resident] (9 June 1997).
[277] Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, Case note of phone call (26 October 1997).
[278] Witness statement of Mr LR (5 May 2022, para 68).
[279] Witness statement of Mr RA (15 August 2022, paras 272–275).
[280] Expert witness report of Dr Enys Delmage (13 June 2022, page 38).
[281] Regulation 2 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996 defined a ‘residence’ as one established under section 364 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, which provides for residences established and / or maintained by the State.
[282] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 3(1).
[283] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 4(1).
[284] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 6.
[285] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 7.
[286] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 10.
[287] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 11.
[288] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 12.
[289] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 13.
[290] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 14.
[291] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 15 and 16.
[292] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 20.
[293] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 21.
[294] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 18(1).
[295] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 18(6).
[296] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 41, revoked from 18 July 2002 by regulation 11 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Amendment Regulations 2002.
[297] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulation 42, revoked from 20 October 2000 by regulation 6 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Amendment Regulations 2000.
[298] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, regulations 46 to 51.
[299] Child, Youth and Family Service, Summary report for Whakapakari for section 396 approval (14 May 2003, page 2).
[300] Child, Youth and Family Service, Summary report for Whakapakari for section 396 approval (14 May 2003, page 2).
[301] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, paras 21–24).
[302] Hewitt, W, Special assessment report of Whakapakari Youth Trust (21 June 2004, page 9).
[303] Expert witness report of Dr Enys Delmage (13 June 2022, page 36).
[304] Witness statement of Ngatokorima Mauauri (2 July 2021, para 101).
[305] Witness statement of Mr SL (28 July 2022, para 3.159).
[306] Witness statement of Michael Bennett (23 January 2023, para 184).
[307] Witness statement of Michael Bennett (23 January 2023, para 186).
[308] Internal Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service email to Grey Lynn Manager Jessie Henderson (10 July 1997).
[309] Witness statement of Mr PM (23 March 2021, para 63).
[310] Witness statement of Mr FQ (23 September 2021, para 67).
[311] Witness statement of Mr PJ (9 November 2021, para 171).
[312] Witness statement of Scott Carr (7 March 2021, para 32).
[313] Witness statement of Jason Fenton (15 April 2022, para 4.42).
[314] Witness statement of Mr PJ (9 November 2021, para 150).
[315] Letter from R Starck to the assistant director General South and West Auckland Region: Whakapakari Youth Programme (19 July 1989, page 2).
[316] Memo to Ken Rand, Child, Youth and Family from Iwi social services team leader re: Whakapakari Youth Trust (8 June 2005, page 2).
[317] Stanley E, The road to hell: State violence against children in postwar New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 2016, page 116); Witness statements of Mr PM (23 March 2021, para 48) and Mr GU (13 April 2021, para 37).
[318] Ministry of Social Development, Chronology of events at Whakapakari (27 February 2015, page 2).
[319] Whakapakari Youth Programme 15 Report (6–30 June 1989).
[320] Child, Youth and Family Service, Background note from Deputy Chief Executive (DCE) Advisor Ken Hand to Private Secretary Rhondda Knox on Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 40): Appendix A Chronology of issues relating to Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 1); Stanley, E, The road to hell: State violence against children in postwar New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 2016, page 241).
[321] Letter from R Starck to the assistant director General South and West Auckland Region: Whakapakari Youth Programme (19 July 1989, page 2).
[322] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994).
[323] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, pages 8–11).
[324] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 4).
[325] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 6).
[326] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 6).
[327] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 12).
[328] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 12).
[329] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 7).
[330] Topzand, P, Assessment of Whakapakari Trust (Children and Young Persons Service, 27 May 1994, page 6).
[331] Memorandum from Community Funding Agency regarding Whakapakari Youth Trust: Review of approval (1 July 1994, page 1).
[332] Memorandum from Community Funding Agency regarding Whakapakari Youth Trust: Review of approval (1 July 1994, page 2).
[333] Memorandum from Community Funding Agency regarding Whakapakari Youth Trust: Review of approval (1 July 1994, page 5).
[334] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 4.1).
[335] Child, Youth and Family Service, Background note from Deputy Chief Executive (DCE) Advisor Ken Hand to Private Secretary Rhondda Knox on Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 40): Appendix A Chronology of issues relating to Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 3).
[336] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995).
[337] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 2.1).
[338] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 2.2).
[339] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 2.3).
[340] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 6).
[341] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995), para 2.5.
[342] Child, Youth and Family Service, Background note from Deputy Chief Executive (DCE) Advisor Ken Hand to Private Secretary Rhondda Knox on Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 40): Appendix A Chronology of issues relating to Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 4).
[343] Child, Youth and Family Service, Background note from Deputy Chief Executive (DCE) Advisor Ken Hand to Private Secretary Rhondda Knox on Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 40): Appendix A Chronology of issues relating to Whakapakari Youth Trust (28 August 2008, page 4).
[344] Eggleston, E, An ethnography of youth texts on gangs, trouble and rehabilitation, Doctoral Thesis, Massey University (1997).
[345] Eggleston, E, “Wilderness rehabilitation: An 18-month follow-up of the Whakapakari Youth Programme,” Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 14 (July 2000, page 10).
[346] For example, the extent to which the Crown relied on the report in litigation brought by residents of Whakapakari. See: Brief of evidence of Michael Doolan for High Court Case (High Court of New Zealand, 1 January 2009, paras 67–78).
[347] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, pages 4–5).
[348] File note of abuse allegation against a staff member at Whakapakari (6 March 1997).
[349] File note of phone call with Wilhemina da Silva (17 March 1997).
[350] Child, Young Persons and Their Families Service, Notes of interview of with [resident], re: Alleged physical abuse at Whakapakari (27 August 1997).
[351] File note of phone call with mother of resident regarding allegations of abuse (27 March 1997, page 1).
[352] Ministry of Social Development, Supervisor’s report on assault by two boys at Whakapakari (9 June 1997).
[353] Letter from mother of child at Whakapakari to Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service (6 June 1997).
[354] Report by Senior Outreach Worker Michael Mills: Appendix 7 to the Green Report (Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, July 1997, page 6).
[355] Email from Senior Outreach Worker Michael Mills to Peter Potaka and Verna Smith: Appendix 8 to the Green Report (29 August 1997, page 3).
[356] Email from Senior Outreach Worker Michael Mills to Peter Potaka and Verna Smith: Appendix 8 to the Green Report (29 August 1997, page 2).
[357] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 13); Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, Appendix 8 to the Green Report: Allegations of Abuse, page 8.
[358] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 13); Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, Appendix 8 to the Green Report: Allegations of Abuse (page 8).
[359] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 16).
[360] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 29).
[361] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 12).
[362] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 13).
[363] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 23).
[364] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 21).
[365] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 22).
[366] Letter from Patty Green, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service to J & W da Silva (10 September 1997, page 39).
[367] Letter from national manager residential and caregivers, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, to Mr da Silva (14 October 1997, page 2).
[368] Brief of evidence of Michael Doolan for High Court Case (High Court of New Zealand, 1 January 2009, para 104); Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (2 March 1998); Note: Letter from national manager residential and caregivers, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service to Mr da Silva, Record of a meeting between Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service and the Community Funding Agency (14 October 1997, page 2).
[369] Cooper Legal, Brief of evidence of David Bagley in support of plaintiff’s claims (25 October 2014, paras 102–103).
[370] Cooper Legal, Brief of evidence of David Bagley in support of plaintiff’s claims (25 October 2014, para 107).
[371] Memorandum from Susan Smith, residential and caregiver services, to National Manager – Residential and caregiver services Janet Worfolk at Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service: Complaint re: Whakapakari (14 August 1998).
[372] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, pages 1–7).
[373] Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021, para 81).
[374] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 3).
[375] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 1, para 5), notes in relation to the complaint: “The Police were not involved”. A later NZ Police report in response to an inquiry by the Children’s Commissioner suggested NZ Police were initially involved in the incident when they interviewed the young people in John da Silva’s presence (24 May 1999).
[376] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 6).
[377] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 7).
[378] Letter from National Manager, Residential and caregiver services Janet Worfolk, to Whakapakari Youth Trust (17 September 1998), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[379] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 7).
[380] Letter from Commissioner for Children Roger McClay to General Manager, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Agency Jackie Brown (20 January 1999), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[381] Letter from acting general manager of Children, Young Persons and Their Families Agency to the Commissioner for Children regarding allegations of incidents against the Whakapakari Youth Trust (2 March 1999, page 2), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[382] NZ Police report from Constable C McGillivray regarding alleged abuse of children on Great Barrier Island, (NZ Police, 24 May 1999, page 1), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[383] Letter from Office of the Commissioner for Children to the general manager, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Agency, regarding Whakapakari Trust Complaint to Commissioner (12 July 1999, page 2), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[384] McClay, R, Final report by the Commissioner for Children into a complaint against the Department of Child, Youth and Family (August 2000, page 2), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[385] McClay, R, Final report by the Commissioner for Children into a complaint against the Department of Child, Youth and Family (August 2000, page 4), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[386] Letter from chief executive of Child, Youth and Family Service to the Commissioner for Children regarding concerns about Whakapakari Trust Programme (6 December 1999, page 2), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[387] Nippert, M, “The Lost Boys of the Barrier,” NZ Herald (5 September 2015); Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998).
[388] Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service was renamed Child, Youth and Family Service in 1999.
[389] McClay, R, Final report by the Commissioner for Children into a complaint against the Department of Child, Youth and Family (August 2000, page 5), as appended to the Witness statement of David Bagley (22 March 2021).
[390] Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (14 May 2003, page 3).
[391] Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (14 May 2003, page 5).
[392] Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (14 May 2003, page 13).
[393] Nippert, M, “Escape from ‘Alcatraz’: What really happened to boys sent to a boot camp on a remote island?”, New Zealand Listener (20 September 2008, page 27).
[394] Child, Youth and Family Service, Departmental report to Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment (8 May 2006, page 2); Memorandum from Child, Youth and Family Service DCE advisor to private secretary: Background note on Whakapakari (28 August 2000, page 15).
[395] Child, Youth and Family Service, Departmental report to Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment (8 May 2006, page 3, para 3).
[396] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, page 2).
[397] Hewitt, W, Special assessment report of Whakapakari Youth Trust (21 June 2004, page 11).
[398] Memorandum from regional manager, social work and community services, Auckland, Child, Youth and Family, to Robert Harper re: Whakapakari (22 October 2004, page 1).
[399] Memo to Ken Rand, Child, Youth and Family Service, from Iwi social services team leader re: Whakapakari Youth Trust” (8 June 2005, page 2).
[400] Child, Youth and Family Service, Departmental report to Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment (8 May 2006, pages 3–5).
[401] Memorandum from Child, Youth and Family Service: Background note on Whakapakari from DCE advisor to private secretary (28 August 2008, pages 2–3).
[402] Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (14 May 2003, page 3); Letter in response to allegation of abuse from supervisor (29 March 2004).
[403] Witness statement of complainant to NZ Police (16 August 2017).
[404] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, page 5).
[405] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, pages 5–6).
[406] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, pages 5–6).
[407] Witness statement of Mr LR (5 May 2022, para 54).
[408] Witness statement of Mr PJ (9 November 2021, para 155).
[409] Witness statement of Mr SL (28 July 2022, para 3.158).
[410] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, page 3).
[411] NZ Police, Auckland City District CIB Report Form regarding John da Silva by detective (3 April 2018, page 6).
[412] NZ Police, Dossier for John da Silva (page 5).
[413] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 4.1).
[414] Survivor requested to remain anonymous (22 February 2023, page 29); Witness statements of Cody Togo (4 May 2023, para 4.19.33) and Mr UU (23 June 2022, para 36).
[415] Witness statement of Mr FQ (23 September 2021, paras 67–70).
[416] Witness statement of Scott Carr (7 March 2021, para 46).
[417] Witness statement of Anthea Raven (17 October 2022, paras 99, 100).
[418] Witness statement of Anthea Raven (17 October 2022, paras 99, 100).
[419] Witness statement of Mr PJ (9 November 2021, para 143); Patient medical history of Mr PJ (22 March 2015, page 1).
[420] NZ Police, Court details of John da Silva (13 December 1990).
[421] Community Funding Agency confirmation of approval and report for Whakapakari Youth Trust as a Child and Family Support Service (2 March 1998 page 2).
[422] Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on investigation of complaints relating to Whakapakari (7 September 1998, page 3).
[423] Nippert, M, “The Lost Boys of the Barrier” NZ Herald (5 September 2015).
[424] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, section 396(3); Brief of evidence of National Operations Manager Verna Smith for the Community Funding Agency (High Court of New Zealand, 8 September 2009, page 3).
[425] Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, section 397.
[426] Brief of evidence of Te Kāhui Kahu General Manager Barry Fisk for the Ministry of Social Development at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (8 August 2022, Appendix A, page 1).
[427] Brief of evidence of National Operations Manager Verna Smith for the Community Funding Agency (High Court of New Zealand, 8 September 2009, page 3).
[428] Brief of evidence of Te Kāhui Kahu General Manager Barry Fisk for the Ministry of Social Development at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 8 August 2022, para 5.13).
[429] Brief of evidence of Michael Doolan for High Court Case (High Court of New Zealand, 1 January 2009, para 60).
[430] Standards were first developed by the Community Funding Agency in 1992, and revised standards in 1995: Brief of evidence of National Operations Manager for the Community Funding Agency (High Court of New Zealand, 8 September 2009, pages 2–4).
[431] Brief of evidence of Michael Doolan for High Court Case (High Court of New Zealand, 1 January 2009, para 65).
[432] Brief of evidence of National Operations Manager for the Community Funding Agency (High Court of New Zealand, 8 September 2009, para 31).
[433] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 4.1).
[434] Transcript of evidence of Te Kāhui Kahu General Manager Barry Fisk for the Ministry of Social Development at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 15 August 2022, pages 59, 61–64).
[435] Witness statement of Cody Togo (4 May 2023, para 4.19.35).
[436] Thom, A, Whakapakari: A brief enquiry (New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service Otara, 1995, para 4.3).
[437] Letter from Community Funding Agency to Child, Youth and Family Service National Office (23 June 1996). See also Letter from national manager residential and caregivers, Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service to Mr da Silva (14 October 1997, page 2).
[438] Brief of evidence of Te Kāhui Kahu General Manager Barry Fisk for the Ministry of Social Development at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 8 August 2022, para 7.8).
[439] Memorandum from Child, Youth and Family Service: Background note on Whakapakari from DCE advisor to private secretary (28 August 2008, page 5).
[440] The Children, Young Persons and Their Families (Residential Care) Regulations 1996, defined a ‘residence’ as one established under section 364 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, which provided for residences established and / or maintained by the State.
[441] Green, P, Report to national manager residential and caregiver services on review of Whakapakari Youth Trust (19 September 1997, para 12).
[442] Witness statement of Cody Togo (4 May 2023, para 4.19.23).
[443] Nippert, M, “Escape from ‘Alcatraz’: What really happened to boys sent to a boot camp on a remote island?”, New Zealand Listener (20 September 2008, page 29).
[444] Stanley, E, The road to hell: State violence against children in postwar New Zealand (Auckland University Press, 2016), as cited in Savage, C, Moyle, P, Kus-Harbord, L, Ahuriri-Driscoll, A, Hynds, A, Paipa, K, Leonard, G, Maraki, J, & Leonard, J, Hāhā-uri hāhā-tea: Māori involvement in State care 1950–1999 (Ihi Research, 2021, page 55).
[445] Transcript of evidence of Chappie Te Kani, Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki, at the Inquiry’s State Institutional Response Hearing (Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, 22 August 2022, page 578).
[446] Transcript of evidence of Mr EH from the Inquiry’s Foster Care Hearing (13 June 2020, page 26).
[447] Whakapakari Trust, Great Barrier Island, Outdoor pursuits programme for youth / justice (21 August 1995).